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Abstract: Researchers have commonly used financial gambles to assess risk preferences, though attitudes 
regarding monetary gambles may differ from those concerning health risks. Moreover, the conventional 
measure of risk preference—the Pratt-Arrow coefficient of relative risk aversion—is a point-elasticity 
suitable only for trivial risks, whereas the risks pertaining to medical treatment—often involving life-or-
death decisions—are quite substantial. Our objective is to examine attitudes toward health risks and the 
variables that influence those attitudes. In addition to the conventional metric, we employ an alternative 
measure of risk aversion designed for large-scale risks; the latter is calculated as an arc-elasticity of marginal 
utility. Both measures are applied to responses from a health preference survey, which incorporates a 
standard gamble over longevity. Measured risk aversion is then related to health and demographic variables 
using multiple linear regressions. Our research suggests that tolerance of health risks may be influenced by 
an endowment effect reflecting the asymmetry of medical information between patients and providers. We 
also find that the arc-elasticity measure captures more of the significant differences and has a stronger 
correlation to demographic and socio-economic variables than does the more traditional point-elasticity 
measure, indicating that the conventional measures of risk aversion are indeed ill suited to large-scale risks 
such as those involving health. In addition, our results suggest that health-related risk preferences may differ 
from financial risk attitudes. Although our sample is relatively small and largely homogeneous, these results 
collectively provide a basis for replication and a justification for additional study on the measurement of risk 
aversion with regard to health.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Medical care is inherently risky, and patients—as well as physicians, nurses, and other care providers—tend 
to be risk averse. Numerous studies have examined the relationship between risk preferences and 
demographic variables, including health and health-related choices.1  However, researchers have commonly 
used financial gambles to assess risk preferences, though attitudes regarding monetary risks may differ from 
attitudes regarding health risks. As Anderson and Mellor (2008) note, “there is not unanimous support for 
linking measures of financial risk tolerance to measures of risk tolerance in other settings, such as health.” 
Thus, the present paper measures risk preferences using survey questions in a health-related context. 
Moreover, the conventional measure of aversion to risk—the Pratt-Arrow coefficient of relative risk 
aversion—is a local measure suitable only for trivial risks, whereas the risks pertaining to medical 
treatment—often involving life-or-death decisions—are anything but trivial. In addition to the conventional 
measure, therefore, we employ an alternative, global measure of risk aversion designed for large-scale risks. 
Both metrics are applied to a standard gamble involving longevity and then correlated with demographic and 
health factors using multiple linear regression. We find that health-related risk preferences differ from 
financial risk preferences among smokers and those in poor health, and that our alternative measure of risk 
aversion captures more of the significant differences involving socio-economic variables than does the 
traditional measure. In addition, by framing the standard gamble in two different ways, we find evidence of 
health-related endowment effects. Section 2 gives an overview of the risk aversion literature and describes 
the standard gamble methodology. Section 3 distinguishes between the two-risk aversions metrics used in 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Hammitt, et al. (2009), Barsky et al. (1997), Eisenhauer and Ventura (2003), and Anderson and 
Mellor (2008). 
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this study. Section 4 describes the survey data and empirical results, comparing them to prior research. 
Section 5 provides a short conclusion. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
A basic tenet of consumer theory is that an individual maximizes utility—a preference function defined over 
goods, money, or other outcome variables. Further, it is widely understood that if a univariate utility function 
is concave (linear, convex), then the individual to whom it belongs exhibits aversion (neutrality, love) toward 
risk, where risk is defined by the variance in the outcome variable. Thus, for nearly half a century following 
the seminal work of Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965), economists have measured an agent’s aversion to risk by 
calculating the curvature of the utility function; as explained below, this is customarily done by evaluating the 
first and second derivatives of the function. The contributions in this field are so numerous that several 
textbooks and literature reviews have now appeared (Eeckhoudt et al. 2005, Meyer and Meyer, 2005, and 
Heinzel, 2009). The vast majority of this literature has measured risk aversion in financial contexts such as 
investments or gambling, in which the outcome variable is pecuniary. Among the most prevalent findings are 
that financial risk aversion is higher among the elderly than others are, higher among women than men are, 
and decreasing in education. Health economists, however, have long recognized that risk is not a uniquely 
monetary phenomenon; risks to health can occur both naturally and because of medical treatment. 
Understanding patients’ attitudes toward such risk is now considered essential to providing quality health 
care; as van der Pol and Ruggeri (2008) note, “the optimal treatment from a patient’s perspective will depend 
amongst other things on their risk attitude.” Because attitudes to health risks tend to differ from attitudes 
toward monetary risks (Prosser and Wittenberg, 2007), it is necessary to examine patient preferences in a 
health-specific context.  
 
The Standard Gamble: To assess patient attitudes toward health risks, the standard gamble has been widely 
used in medical research. Indeed, it is often viewed as the “gold standard” for evaluating preferences 
concerning health states (Ben-Zion and Gafni, 1983; Puhan, et al. 2007). Furthermore, as Torrence et al. 
(2002) point out, “The standard gamble is the only measurement method that captures the respondent’s risk 
attitude and thus provides a measure that is appropriate for decisions with uncertainty.” Several versions of 
the standard gamble have been utilized in the health services research literature. In one, a subject is told that 
a risky treatment will result in either a good outcome (G) with probability p or a bad outcome (B) with 
probability 1 – p, and is then asked what certain outcome (C) would generate as much satisfaction as facing 
the gamble, where outcomes are typically measured in years of healthy living. Examples of this approach 
include the studies by Verhoef, et al. (1994), Nakata, et al. (2000), Prosser and Wittenberg (2007), and van 
der Pol and Ruggeri (2008).2  In another version, the subject confronts a choice between a certain outcome 
and a risky outcome, and is asked what probability (p) of a good outcome would make him or her indifferent 
between the risky outcome and the certain outcome (see for example, Gyrd-Hansen (2002) and Oliver and 
Cookson, (2010)). In either case, the expected utility equation is the same: for a utility function U defined over 
the lifetime X, the utility from the certainty equivalent is equal to the expected utility of the gamble. Thus,  
 
   .                (1) 
  
For an initial value (i.e., current age) of , the good outcome is , the bad outcome is , 
and the certainty equivalent is , where the mean of the gamble is , and its 
variance is . The risk premium π is the difference between the expected 
lifetime,  and its certainty equivalent. For any given risk, a lower certainty equivalent (or 
                                                 
2
 Two variants of this approach have been used. In one, the respondent is directly asked to state the certainty 
equivalent of a risk; in the other, pairs of lotteries are ranked until the respondent expresses indifference, and the 
certainty equivalent is inferred from the choice. For a comparison, see Law, et al. (1998).  
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larger risk premium) indicates greater aversion to the risk. Indeed,  implies risk aversion, C = 
E(X) implies risk neutrality, and  implies a love of risk.3   
 
Point and Arc Elasticity Measures of Risk Aversion: In order to draw comparisons across individuals 
and/or across risks, the results of the standard gamble are typically converted into a numeric measure of risk 
aversion. Following Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965), one such metric is the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion, defined as the negative ratio of the second derivative of utility to the first derivative; that 
is, ; see for example Johannson (1995). Because utility is not directly observable, it is 
necessary to either impose an assumption regarding the functional form of utility, or adopt Pratt’s (1964) 
approximation, , to make this measure operational.4  However, the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion is not elasticity, but rather, is sensitive to the units in which the outcome is measured (for example, 
whether wealth is measured in dollars or euros, or whether time is measured in years or months). To convert 
a(X) into an index number, Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) multiply a(X) by X to define the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion, r(X) = Xa(X), which represents the point elasticity of marginal utility with respect to X. 
Pratt’s approximation then gives   . Unfortunately, both the exact and approximate coefficients 
are based on differential calculus, and are therefore applicable exclusively to infinitesimal changes in the 
argument of the utility function; that is, they are only suitable for use with trivial risks (Eisenhauer, 2006, 
2008).5  Thus, Pratt (1964) described them as “risk aversion in the small”. For large risks, the Pratt-Arrow 
coefficient often yields perverse rankings of preferences (Eisenhauer, 2010a), and frequently fails to capture 
statistically significant differences between population subgroups (Eisenhauer and Ventura, 2011).6   
 
To address these problems, an arc elasticity measure of risk aversion has been developed for use with large, 
discrete changes (Eisenhauer, 2006); the new metric is especially suited to standard gambles involving two 
risky states (Eisenhauer, 2010b). From (1), define the following discrete utility changes, or discrete marginal 
utilities:   
    
                   (2)  
  
                   (3) 
  
                   (4) 
As depicted in Figure 1, , , and  represent the slopes of chords along a utility function from B to C, 
from C to G, and from B to G, respectively.7  If equations (2) through (4) were calculated in the limit as the 
                                                 
3
 Under the assumption that longevity is good and more is therefore preferred to less, C  < B or C  > G indicates 
irrationality.   
 
4
 The Pratt-Arrow coefficient is based on small changes in a continuous variable, originally taken to be wealth. For 
riskless wealth  and risky wealth   with a mean of , the expected utility equation is 
. Taking a Taylor series approximation, Pratt (1964) derived 
, which gives 
 where  . Thus, a(X) measures absolute risk aversion at a single point: 
the expected value of final wealth. 
 
5
 By definition, a derivative is the change in a function (e.g., utility) as the change in its argument approaches zero in 
the limit; thus  , so that risk preference metrics based on derivatives are 
appropriate only for infinitesimal risks.  
 
6
 Using the Pratt-Arrow coefficient of absolute risk aversion in a health context, Nakata et al. (2000) found no 
significant differences in risk aversion between anesthesiologists and surgeons, regardless of whether they viewed 
themselves as patients or health care providers, and no significant difference between men and women. 
7
 The concavity of the utility function in Figure 1 depicts risk aversion, but this is merely one possibility. A risk 
lover’s utility function would exhibit convexity between B and G. 
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denominators of their right-hand sides went to zero, each would denote a first derivative of utility, or a 
marginal utility “in the small”.   
 
Figure 1: Utility Function for a Risk Averse Individual 
 
 
 
Notice that   is a weighted average of  and : 
 
                 (5)  
 
In addition, (1) can be rewritten as 
 
   .                (6)  
 
Substituting (6) into (5) generates 
 
    .               (7) 
 
To construct an arc elasticity measure of relative risk aversion, we divide the difference in discrete marginal 
utilities, , by their average, . From (6) and (7), this gives  
 
                   (8) 
Utility 
U(G) 
U(C) 
U(B) 
Outcome C G B 
100 
 
Notice that the units of measurement cancel in (8), so that R is a pure index number.8  To simplify the result, 
the certainty equivalent can be transformed into , where  for all . 
The arc elasticity measure of risk aversion can then be written as 
 
   .                 (9) 
 
The measure of risk aversion given in (9) is quite general in that it does not assume any particular shape or 
functional form of utility. For an individual who exhibits aversion to a given risk, R > 0; for a love of risk, R < 0, 
and R = 0 for risk neutrality.9 As an example, consider a health risk in which the good outcome is an additional 
25 years of life, which occurs with probability 0.5, and the bad outcome is only one additional year with 
probability 0.5; the mean is 13 years, the variance is 144, and the standard deviation is 12 years. Suppose that 
the individual is currently 24 years old, so the expected lifetime is 37 years. Suppose further that the certainty 
equivalent is 36 years, as it would be if the (unobservable) utility function were the square root of X. Then the 
risk premium is π = 1, and a(X) ≈ 2(1)/144 = 0.01388. The Pratt-Arrow coefficient of relative risk aversion is 
r(X) ≈ (37)(2)(1)/144 = 0.5139.10  Alternatively, using the discrete metrics, c = 11/24 = 0.4583 and R = 
0.1678. For a second individual of the same age whose utility function is logarithmic and who faces the same 
risk, the certainty equivalent is 35 years. For this person, r(X) ≈ 1.028 and R = 0.3429; (s)he exhibits roughly 
twice as much aversion to this risk as the first individual. In the following section, we apply both the point-
elasticity and arc-elasticity measures to responses from a health preference survey, which incorporates a 
standard gamble, in order to relate risk aversion to health and demographic variables.  
 
3. Empirical Application 
 
Survey Description: The survey contained eighteen questions, most of which have commonly been used in 
the health preferences literature when measuring risk aversion. Respondents were asked to provide 
descriptive information including gender, age, income, religion, race, and education, as well as marital and 
employment status. We also gathered additional information that could affect risk preferences such as the 
number of dependents, self-reported health status, and smoking habits, in addition to the availability of 
health insurance and the amount of any life insurance they might have. Because self-reported health status is 
rather subjective, we also requested more objective health data, including information on any chronic 
illnesses or disabilities. In addition, height (in inches) and weight (in pounds) were used to construct a body 
mass index (BMI) for each individual according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
formula, 
 
   .              (10)   
 
Following CDC guidelines for adults, BMI ≥ 25 is considered overweight, and BMI ≥ 30 is considered obese 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011). To measure the individual’s risk preference, we posed a 
standard gamble question. Because we also wished to test for the presence of endowment effects, two 
different versions were used.11  In version 1, the question read,  
                                                 
8
 If a discrete measure of absolute risk aversion is desired, Eisenhauer and Ventura (2011) propose dividing R by the 
average of gains and losses; in this case, . The resulting measure of absolute 
risk aversion is not an elasticity, however, and is therefore of less interest than R.  
  
9
 Eisenhauer (2008) demonstrates construct validity for R.  
  
10
 If the utility function U(X) = X
0.5 
was observable, then r(X) = 0.5 could be calculated directly from the first and 
second derivatives. The gap between the exact and approximate values results from measuring aversion to a large 
risk with a metric designed for small risks. 
11
 In the context of consumer goods, the endowment effect indicates that willingness to accept (WTA) exceeds 
willingness to pay (WTP): an individual who owns a good demands a higher price to sell it than (s)he would pay to 
buy it if (s)he did not own it. See, for example, Knetch and Wong (2009).  
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Imagine that you have an illness which does not cause any serious discomfort, but which will ultimately prove 
to be fatal. Without treatment, there is a 50% chance of surviving 1 year and a 50% chance of surviving 25 
years. A treatment is available which would allow you to survive this illness for a specific period; the 
treatment is free, painless, and has no side effects. Please fill in the blank:  If it were guaranteed that I would 
survive at least ____ years with the treatment, then I would choose to receive the treatment rather than face 
the risk of surviving 1 year or 25 years. Thus, in version 1, the respondent was effectively endowed with risk, 
and was asked at what rate (s)he would trade that risk for the certainty offered by medical treatment. In 
version 2, the scenario was reversed: the treatment was risky, and the respondent indicated how much 
certain longevity (s)he would forego to accept the risk.12  Appendix 1 contains a complete copy of the final 
survey instrument (version 1). Subjects were randomly assigned one of the two versions.  
 
We initially distributed the survey as a pilot project to 31 students in an MBA accounting course at a private 
university in the spring of 2011. The preliminary results indicated that the respondents did not fully 
understand the standard gamble question. We clarified the wording of this question into its final form (as 
above) and distributed the revised survey to different classes. The new sample of 92 respondents 
represented 77 students from four MBA classes at a small private university in the Northeastern U.S. and 15 
students from a Master’s level course in the Economics of Health and Health Policy at a large public university 
in the Midwest. Table 1 summarizes the sample characteristics. The respondents’ ages ranged from 21 to 59 
years with the average respondent being 27 years old. 19 percent were minorities, and females comprised 
approximately 46% of the sample. Roughly, two-thirds had never been married, and the average number of 
dependents was 0.35. The vast majority reported themselves as being in excellent or good health. More than 
three-quarters had never smoked, and 12 percent had quit smoking. However, using the BMI, 43% were 
found to be overweight, including 9% who qualified as obese. Eleven percent reported having a chronic 
illness or disability. Nearly all respondents (98%) had some form of health insurance, but only about one-
third carried life insurance. Three-quarters of the sample were either employed or self-employed. Of these, 
4% reported a high risk of serious injury or illness at work, 16% reported moderate risk, and 80% reported 
low risk. 56% of the sample reported a household income of less than $50,000 per year. In size and 
composition, our sample was similar to those used in several prior studies.13 
 
4. Results 
 
Responses to the standard gamble question were highly varied. 6.5% of the sample failed to answer the 
question, and 12% provided economically irrational answers.14  After removing those, slightly more than half 
of the remaining sample (39 out of 75) exhibited risk aversion, as reported in Table 2. The responses ranged 
                                                 
12
 Version 2 read: Imagine that you have an illness which does not cause any serious discomfort but which will 
ultimately prove to be fatal. A treatment is available which provides a 50% chance of surviving 1 year and a 50% 
chance of surviving 25 years. The treatment is free, painless, and has no side effects. Please fill in the blank: If it 
were guaranteed that I would survive for at least ___ years without treatment, then I would choose to forego the 
treatment rather than face the risk of surviving 1 year or 25 years. 
 
13
 The sample sizes in Nakata et al. (2000) and Puhan et al. (2007) were 93 and 96, respectively. Gyrd-Hansen 
(2002) used a convenience sample of 78 graduate students aged 23 to 58; van der Pol and Ruggeri (2008) surveyed 
102 students, 56 percent of whom were male; and Prosser and Wittenberg (2007) used two smaller samples, one of 
which covered 57 respondents of whom 77 percent were white and 53 percent were female, with an income 
distribution similar to that of the respondents in our study. 
 
14
 See footnote 3 for the definition. There is a growing literature in behavioral economics, which suggests that 
irrationality is not uncommon, especially when respondents confront important and complex decisions; see, for 
example, San Miguel et al. (2005) and Ariely (2008). In a health context, San Miguel et al. (2005) found that 
between 5.5 percent and 20.6 percent of respondents failed rationality tests. 
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from infinitely risk averse (C = B) to infinitely risk loving (C = G).15  Because the gamble fixes µ = 13 and 
, we have a(X) = 2π/144. Then for an individual whose current age is denoted by , the Pratt-
Arrow coefficient of relative risk aversion is calculated as  . The coefficient of 
relative risk aversion ranged from -11.5 to 11.0, with a mean of 0.0586 and a median of 0.833. The arc 
elasticity measure of risk aversion, R, is calculated according to (9). The distribution of R, which ranged from 
negative infinity to positive infinity, was bimodal at -0.34 and +0.53, with a median of 0.17; among its finite 
values the mean was 0.0585. There was no statistically significant difference in the means of the two 
preference metrics. 
 
Table 1: Demographic Characteristics 
Characteristic Percentage 
Male 54% 
White 81% 
Catholic 53% 
Protestant 19% 
Never Married 64% 
Married 20% 
Unwed Partner 13% 
Divorced/Separated 3% 
Employed 71% 
Self-employed 4% 
Unemployed 10% 
Not in Labor Force 15% 
Income < $25,000 36% 
$25,000-$50,000 20% 
$50,000-$75,000 16% 
$75,000-$100,000 9% 
Income > $100,000 19% 
Graduate Degree 36% 
Excellent Health 32% 
Good Health 65% 
Fair Health 3% 
Never Smoked 78% 
Quit Smoking 12% 
Smokes Occasionally 7% 
Smokes Regularly 3% 
Chronic Illness/Disability 11% 
Overweight 43% 
Obese 9% 
Group Health Insurance 64% 
Military Health Insurance 2% 
Individual Health Insurance 11% 
Public Health Insurance 1% 
Other Health Insurance 20% 
Life Insurance 33% 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 Note that the Pratt-Arrow coefficients fail to recognize these responses as infinite risk aversion and infinite love of 
risk; rather, for C = B, a(X) = 0.1667 and for C = G, a(X) = -0.1667. Eisenhauer (2010a) observes the same 
phenomenon. 
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Table 2: Risk Preferences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our investigation of the endowment effect took the form of a simple chi-square test of independence. Subjects 
who responded to version 1 of the standard gamble were more likely to be risk averse than those who 
responded to version 2, and the difference was significant at the (two-tailed) .084 level. Thus, individuals 
endowed with risk appeared to be somewhat more averse to it than those endowed with certainty that were 
given the option to choose risk. To put this result another way, there appeared to be greater aversion to a 
naturally occurring health risk than to a comparable risk arising from medical care. To examine the effects of 
individual characteristics on risk preferences, we conducted multiple linear regressions of demographic 
variables on both r(X) and R. Using backward elimination, we began with a full slate of independent variables 
and removed those with the most insignificant t-statistics. Several iterations are reported in Tables 3 and 4. 
The respondent’s current age and the number of dependents were both continuous variables; the other 
independent variables were indicators. The dummy for relationship status took the value 1 if the individual 
was in an unwed domestic partnership, and zero otherwise; the performance of alternative indicators (for 
example, 1 if married and 0 otherwise) was not substantially different.   
 
In general, the regressions run on r(X) showed less explanatory power (adjusted R-square) than those run on 
R: less than15 percent for the former compared with 19 to 26 percent for the latter. In none of the regressions 
was race, religion, or age statistically significant.16  In both sets of regressions, a high risk of occupational 
injury or illness was correlated with lower aversion to risk. This most likely reflects a self-selection pattern: 
those who are inherently more tolerant of health risk (i.e., least risk averse) are most likely to accept 
physically risky jobs. Although relationship status was not significant, the presence of dependents had a 
significant positive effect on health-related risk aversion: those who bear responsibility for other human 
beings’ welfare were less willing than those without dependents to accept physical risks to themselves. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the presence of life insurance was not a significant factor. That result may reflect a 
data quality issue: it appeared that many respondents were unsure whether they had life insurance coverage, 
and if so, how much. It is also likely that most of those who had coverage had received it as an employee 
benefit rather than having deliberately purchased a policy, in which case their coverage may not reflect risk 
preferences. Health insurance was similarly insignificant. This is not surprising, since the choice to accept, a 
free treatment would not be expected to depend on health insurance.17 
 
Three variables, which have been widely tested in other risk preference studies, are gender, income, and 
education. Among the most widely replicated results in the financial risk literature is the finding that women 
are more risk averse than men (Levin, et al., 1988; Powell and Ansic, 1997; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; 
Hammitt et al., 2009; Neelakantan, 2010; von Gaudecker et al., 2011). We obtained this same result with the 
arc elasticity measure, but not with the point elasticity measure. Indeed, for r(X), the coefficient on Male had 
the theoretically wrong sign and lacked statistical significance. Likewise, previous work shows that risk 
aversion declines with education (Eisenhauer, 2008; Eisenhauer and Ventura, 2011; von Gaudecker et al., 
2011). While all of our subjects were enrolled in graduate school, some had already completed a prior 
graduate degree. Compared with prior research, the education coefficient had the wrong sign and lacked 
significance in the point elasticity regressions. By contrast, the results for the arc elasticity measure R 
                                                 
16
 Prior research indicates higher risk aversion among the elderly, but the age range in our sample did not permit us 
to compare elderly against non-elderly individuals. 
 
17
 Because the overwhelming majority of respondents had some form of health insurance, we combined ‘other’ with 
‘none’ to generate the indicator. 
Risk Preference Percentage 
Infinitely risk averse 8% 
Finitely risk averse 44% 
Risk neutral 1% 
Finitely risk loving 31% 
Infinitely risk loving 16% 
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conformed to our expectations: the presence of a pre-existing graduate degree reduced risk aversion.18  In 
addition, household income was insignificant in the point elasticity regressions, whereas the regressions with 
the arc elasticity measure indicated that lower-income individuals were more risk averse than higher-income 
individuals; the latter finding corresponds with most prior research on financial risk (Eisenhauer, 2008; 
Hammitt et al., 2009; Eisenhauer and Ventura, 2011). Controlling for income, however, the unemployed 
showed a lower degree of risk aversion than their employed counterparts did, though the effect was only 
marginally significant on the arc elasticity measure R.   
  
Table 3: Regression Results for r(X)* 
 
Variable 
Coeff 
[prob] 
Coeff 
[prob] 
Coeff 
[prob] 
Coeff 
[prob] 
Coeff 
[prob] 
Coeff 
[prob] 
Constant -0.108 
[.975] 
-0.055 
[.987] 
-0.056 
[.986] 
-0.722 
[.701] 
-0.501 
[.777] 
-0.545 
[.755] 
Age -0.038 
[.719] 
-0.039 
[.701] 
-0.035 
[.715] 
   
Male 0.762 
[.582] 
0.797 
[.533] 
0.817 
[.512] 
0.672 
[.568] 
0.718 
[.520] 
0.738 
[.505] 
White 0.851 
[.626] 
0.858 
[.619] 
0.725 
[.662] 
0.723 
[.635] 
0.680 
[.646] 
0.672 
[.647] 
Protestant -04.24 
[.788] 
-0.419 
[.788] 
    
Relationship Status 0.129 
[.944] 
     
Dependents 1.541 
[.098] 
1.549 
[.091] 
1.577 
[.077] 
1.447 
[.044] 
1.463 
[.038] 
1.399 
[.040] 
Grad Degree 0.537 
[.751] 
0.538 
[.748] 
0.544 
[.727] 
   
Unemployed -4.698 
[.031] 
-4.693 
[.029] 
-4.863 
[.018] 
-4.987 
[.013] 
-4.982 
[.012] 
-5.002 
[.011] 
High Risk Job -6.328 
[.063] 
-6.356 
[.058] 
-6.188 
[.055] 
-5.779 
[.055] 
-5.990 
[.046] 
-5.706 
[.048] 
Income < $50,000 -1.078 
[.440] 
-1.098 
[.416] 
-1.152 
[.379] 
-1.128 
[.373] 
-1.054 
[.395] 
-1.100 
[.369] 
Life Insurance 0.414 
[.799] 
0.406 
[.800] 
    
No/Other Health 
Insurance 
 
-1.816 
[.332] 
-1.822 
[.325] 
-1.797 
[.322] 
-1.721 
[.331] 
-1.603 
[.335] 
-1.525 
[.352] 
Excellent Health 
 
0.863 
[.520] 
0.853 
[.518] 
0.857 
[.507] 
.868 
[.494] 
0.765 
[.535] 
0.788 
[.519] 
Chronic Illness/Disability -1.011 
[.643] 
-1.031 
[.630] 
-0.890 
[.665] 
-0.873 
[.664] 
-0.795 
[.686] 
 
Smoker 4.481 
[.056] 
4.488 
[.053] 
4.478 
[.045] 
4.597 
[.031] 
4.671 
[.025] 
4.589 
[.026] 
Overweight 0.486 
[.710] 
0.473 
[.712] 
0.551 
[.650] 
0.503 
[.672] 
  
R-square .271 .271 .269 .266 .263 .260 
Adj. R-square .028 .048 .082 .114 .129 .142 
SE 4.6210 4.5739 4.4901 4.4127 4.3441 4.3115 
*Two-tailed prob-values in brackets 
 
 
                                                 
18
 A chi-square test showed no significant difference in risk preferences between the graduate students in Economics 
and those in Business.   
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Table 4:  Regression Results for R* 
 
Variable 
Coeff 
[prob] 
Coeff 
[prob] 
Coeff 
[prob] 
Coeff 
[prob] 
Coeff 
[prob] 
Coeff 
[prob] 
Constant -3.418 
[.260] 
-3.332 
[.260] 
-3.187 
[.268] 
-2.705 
[.310] 
-2.716 
[.304] 
-1.240 
[.560] 
Age 0.094 
[.323] 
0.092 
[.324] 
0.089 
[.330] 
0.084 
[.341] 
0.089 
[.309] 
0.076 
[.372] 
Male -2.077 
[.082] 
-2.004 
[.074] 
-1.972 
[.074] 
-1.830 
[.084] 
-1.863 
[.076] 
-1.792 
[.084] 
White 1.148 
[.399] 
1.163 
[.385] 
1.158 
[.381] 
1.113 
[.388] 
1.249 
[.321] 
 
Protestant 0.765 
[.558] 
0.821 
[.514] 
0.795 
[.521] 
0.698 
[.562] 
  
Relationship Status 0.325 
[.839] 
     
Dependents 1.275 
[.084] 
1.291 
[.074] 
1.296 
[.069] 
1.224 
[.071] 
1.231 
[.067] 
1.311 
[.048] 
Grad Degree -2.328 
[.118] 
-2.350 
[.109] 
-2.306 
[.109] 
-2.247 
[.105] 
-2.396 
[.077] 
-2.766 
[.038] 
Unemployed -3.459 
[.134] 
-3.446 
[.130] 
-3.506 
[.117] 
-3.601 
[.100] 
-3.707 
[.086] 
-2.879 
[.123] 
High Risk Job -6.971 
[.024] 
-7.007 
[.021] 
-7.065 
[.018] 
-6.888 
[.018] 
-6.900 
[.016] 
-7.143 
[.012] 
Income < $50,000 2.453 
[.058] 
2.412 
[.056] 
2.403 
[.053] 
2.309 
[.049] 
2.303 
[.048] 
2.432 
[.036] 
Life Insurance 1.527 
[.272] 
1.532 
[.263] 
1.479 
[.269] 
1.425 
[.276] 
1.349 
[.296] 
1.366 
[.286] 
No/Other Health 
Insurance 
 
0.433 
[.777] 
0.438 
[.771] 
    
Excellent Health 
 
0.608 
[.592] 
0.592 
[.595] 
0.565 
[.606] 
   
Chronic Illness/Disability -1.983 
[.232] 
-2.044 
[.205] 
-2.074 
[.191] 
-2.081 
[.181] 
-2.092 
[.174] 
-2.185 
[.152] 
Smoker 7.162 
[.002] 
7.248 
[.001] 
7.155 
[.001] 
6.897 
[.001] 
6.784 
[.001] 
6.795 
[.001] 
Overweight -1.479 
[.194] 
-1.523 
[.167] 
-1.500 
[.166] 
-1.601 
[.128] 
-1.554 
[.135] 
-1.781 
[.082] 
R-square .452 .451 .450 .445 .440 .416 
Adj. R-square .186 .209 .229 .250 .263 .256 
SE 3.3124 3.2654 3.2225 3.1592 3.1318 3.1273 
*Two-tailed prob-values in brackets 
 
Self-reported health status had no significant effects on either the point-elasticity or arc-elasticity measure of 
risk aversion. Neither weight status nor the chronic illness/disability indicator showed a strong level of 
significance, and in the point elasticity regressions, these two indicators generated opposite signs. In the arc 
elasticity regressions, by contrast, the two indicators yielded the same negative sign and the weight indicator 
was marginally significant; the latter finding is consistent with the results of Anderson and Mellor (2008). We 
thus have weak evidence that those in poor health are less averse to health risks than those in better health. 
This finding contrasts with prior research showing that those in poor health are more averse to financial risks 
(Eisenhauer and Ventura, 2011). At the same time, however, smokers exhibited greater aversion to the 
proposed health risk than non-smokers in both sets of regressions. Prior research tends to suggest that 
smokers are less averse than non-smokers to financial risks (Barsky, et al., 1997; Eisenhauer, 2000; Anderson 
and Mellor, 2008), and indeed, Hersch (1996) assumes that smoking is a priori evidence of risk tolerance.   
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5.  Conclusion 
 
Our study suggests the following tentative conclusions. First, tolerance of health risk may be influenced by an 
endowment effect. That is, aversion to risk appeared to be greater when longevity was uncertain without 
medical care than when medical treatment caused the uncertainty. This could suggest an inherent faith or 
confidence in medical care, such that patients prefer the risks associated with treatment to the risk from not 
having treatment. This seems quite reasonable, given the asymmetry of medical information: patients 
recognize that their knowledge of health care is inferior to that of their physicians. Second, those who face a 
high risk of occupational illness or physical injury appear to be more tolerant than others of health risks. 
Third, several of the same factors that affect financial risk preferences may also affect health-related risk 
preferences; these include gender, education, income, and the presence of dependents. However, the arc-
elasticity measure of risk aversion captures more of the significant differences and has a stronger correlation 
to demographic and socio-economic variables than does the more traditional point-elasticity measure of 
relative risk aversion. This adds to the growing body of evidence, which suggests that the conventional 
measures of risk aversion are ill suited to large-scale risks such as those involving health.   
 
Finally, we also find some evidence that health-related risk preferences differ from financial risk attitudes in 
at least two respects. Whereas prior research suggests that smokers are more tolerant of financial risks than 
non-smokers, the current study finds smokers to be significantly less willing than non-smokers to take 
additional health risks. On the other hand, whereas prior research shows those in poor health to be more 
averse to financial risk, we find them less averse than healthier individuals to health-related risks. Several 
important caveats regarding this data set are pertinent to these findings. In particular, because the sample is 
relatively small and largely homogeneous, it is dangerous to extrapolate the results to broader populations. In 
addition, responses to hypothetical survey questions must inevitably be interpreted with caution, since there 
is no safeguard for respondent veracity. Thus, as in any research, the results presented here are not 
conclusive. They do, however, provide a basis for replication and a justification for additional study on the 
measurement of risk aversion with regard to health.  
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